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Abstract
This article examines the link between restrictions on the number of physicians and general
practitioners￿earnings. Using a representative panel of 6;016 French self-employed GPs over the
years 1983 to 2004, we show that the policies aimed at manipulating the number of places in
medical schools strongly a⁄ect physicians￿permanent level of earnings.
We estimate an earnings function to identify experience, time and cohort e⁄ects. The cohort
e⁄ect is very large: the estimated gap in earnings between "good" and "bad" cohorts may reach
25%. GPs beginning during the eighties have the lowest permanent earnings: they belong to
the baby-boom numerous cohorts and faced the consequences of an unlimited number of places
in medical schools. Conversely, the decrease in the number of places in medical schools led to
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Author manuscript, published in "Health Economics 17, 9 (2008) 1037-1055"an increase in permanent earnings of GPs who began their practice in the mid nineties. A sto-
chastic dominance analysis shows that unobserved heterogeneity does not compensate for average
di⁄erences in earnings between cohorts. These ￿ndings suggest that the ￿rst years of practice
are decisive for a GP. If competition between physicians is too intense at the beginning of career,
she will su⁄er from permanently lower earnings. To conclude, our results show that the policies
aimed at reducing the number of medical students succeeded in buoying up physicians￿permanent
earnings.
JEL Classi￿cation : C2, D63, I18
Keywords:GPs, self-employed, longitudinal data, earnings, stochastic dominance
1 Introduction
Like many industrialized countries, France experienced a rapid increase in the total number of physi-
cians after the Second World War. For general practitioners (GPs), the physician:population ratio
increased continously until 2000 and it is currently one of the highest among OECD countries. Such
an increase may be appropriate if there was a previous shortage in medical services. At some point,
however, needs are ful￿lled and an excessive number of physicians is likely to lower their earnings.
In France, GPs are paid on a fee-for-services basis. Since fees are ￿xed by bargaining, there is
no market-clearing price for ambulatory care. Equilibrium can be reached with adjustments in care
quality, such as changes in the duration of consultations. However, this kind of adjustment is necessarily
limited: an excessive number of GPs leads to a situation where more doctors share a limited amount
of demand. Consequently, each GP provides a lower quantity of services and receives lower earnings
because of the fee-for-services payment system.
In France, the baby-boom led to a huge increase in the number of medical students at the end of
the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. In order to regulate the supply of health care, a reform









































9clausus de￿nes the annual number of students allowed to continue their medical studies after the ￿rst
year.
By the end of the seventies, all the French physicians￿associations had become aware that their
earnings were threatened by an excessive number of physicians: they put pressure on the government
for a sizeable reduction in the number of new practitioners. Afterwards, the numerus clausus was
drastically cut. A severely restrictive policy was thus implemented as of 1979. Given that studies to
become a GP last 9 to 10 years, its potential e⁄ects can be observed only for physicians who began to
practice in the year 1988 or later.
It is politically di¢ cult for governments to implement or reduce a numerus clausus. Indeed, they
are immediately confronted with the dissatisfaction of ￿rst year medical students. Furthermore, the
impact of such policies is not perceptible for a long time because of the duration of medical studies.
This article examines the link between regulation of the number of physicians in France and GPs￿
earnings. Using longitudinal data about French GPs, we estimate earnings functions to identify expe-
rience, cohort and time e⁄ects. The cohort is de￿ned by the ￿rst year in practice. We focus on cohort
e⁄ects to examine the relationship between changes in medical demography and earnings inequality
among doctors. Did GPs￿earnings su⁄er from an excessive number of new practioners for those who
set up their practices during the eighties? Did subsequent cohorts bene￿t from restrictions in the
numerus clausus? In other words, did the numerus clausus buoy up physicians￿earnings?
Because of the 10 year time lag in the impact of such a policy, empirical evaluation calls for the
use of a sample of physicians observed over a su¢ ciently long period. We have at our disposal a
representative panel of 6;016 French self-employed GPs observed over the 1983 ￿ 2004 period, which
corresponds to 81;691 individual-year observations, and to cohorts who began their practice between
1970 and 2001.









































9public health insurance scheme. Reliable data on the earnings of self-employed workers in general are
rare. French ambulatory care administration produces reliable data on physicians￿earnings: the public
health insurance scheme observes GPs￿earnings because it reimburses patients for their payments to
doctors.
Literature about physicians￿earnings in industrialized countries is rare. Most studies focus on
the impact of payment schemes on care provision (McGuire, 2000). More broadly, studies about self-
employed professionals are rather scarce. Pioneering work was performed in 1945 by Friedman and
Kuznets who compared physicians to other professionals (lawyers, dentists). Lazear and Moore (1984)
studied careers of self-employed professionals using cross-sectional data. More recently, Ajayi-Obe and
Parker (2005) compared earnings of British self-employed professionals and employees using longitu-
dinal data, but without studying the career pro￿les. To our knowledge, no one to date has estimated
the career pro￿les of self-employed professionals using longitudinal data. Our estimates of physicians￿
career pro￿les make it possible to understand why medical demography at the beginning of practice
has so much in￿ uence on their permanent earnings. Moreover, our pro￿le estimates might shed light on
results relative to salaried workers. For the latter, the in￿ uence of seniority on earnings is thought to re-
￿ ect human capital accumulation and productivity incentives implemented by ￿rm managers (Lazear,
1981). The earnings pro￿les of self-employed physicians may be shaped by human capital accumula-
tion, but there are no agency problems. Furthermore, they have more freedom than employees in the
allocation of work time over their life spans.
This paper is organized as follows. The ￿rst section describes the French market for ambulatory
care. Then we present the data and a descriptive analysis of ￿ uctuations in medical demography
resulting from general demographic change and the numerus clausus. The following section is devoted
to the estimation of the earnings function, with identi￿cation of time, experience and cohort e⁄ects. In









































9we carry out a stochastic dominance analysis to ￿nd out whether or not average di⁄erences between
GPs belonging to di⁄erent cohorts could be cancelled out by individual unobserved heterogeneity. The
￿nal section concludes.
2 The French market for ambulatory care
2.1 Insurance coverage
In France, about 99% of the population is covered by the public health insurance scheme. For each
service provided, there is a reference fee ￿xed by agreement between physicians and the health insurance
administration. Public health insurance is mandatory and ￿nanced by income-related contributions. It
covers about 70% of the expenses corresponding to the reference fees. In addition to the public system,
individuals can take out voluntary private insurance or be covered through occupational group private
insurance. These complementary insurance contracts cover the share of expenses not covered by public
health insurance (30%). Through these di⁄erent kinds of insurance schemes, reference fees for 80%
of the population were fully covered until 2000: In that year, a reform (CMU, Couverture Maladie
Universelle) was implemented to provide free complementary coverage to people with low incomes.
Since the introduction of the CMU, reference fees have been fully covered for almost all the population.
Hence, on the demand side, there is no ￿nancial limit to the use of ambulatory care. Moreover, patients
freely choose the physician they consult and can change their physician for another one at any time. To
avoid excessive use of ambulatory care, a gatekeeping system was introduced at the end of year 2004.










































92.2 Physicians￿payments and behaviour
In France, physicians providing ambulatory care are general practitioners or specialists. They are
mainly self-employed and paid through a fee-for-service scheme. In this article, we focus on GPs, more
than 90% of whom are exclusively self-employed. As stated above, reference fees are ￿xed for each
service. More precisely, there are two sectors: in sector 1 overbilling is forbidden and in sector 2 it is
authorized. GPs were allowed to join sector 2 only between 1982 and 1992: Currently, most GPs (87%)
belong to sector 1 and are paid the reference fees. Therefore, their incomes depend only on the level
and composition of their activity. The latter is mainly composed of o¢ ce visits (82% in year 2004) and
home visits (15%), the remaining part being composed of small procedures (3%).
The market for ambulatory care is characterized by a monopolistically competitive structure
(McGuire, 2000). Physicians are not perfect substitutes and have some market power because of di⁄er-
ences in location and care quality. Each physician is supposed to maximize her utility, subject to the
production function and the demand function. The production function describes the provision of care
services, which depends positively on the number of hours of work and negatively on visit duration.1
Competition is more intense when the number of physicians increases: for each physician, the demand
depends negatively on the number of physicians operating in the same area, and positively on visit
duration (linked to care quality). Given the homogeneity of fees in sector 1 and the fact that patients
are fully covered by insurance, fee levels have no in￿ uence on demand for services from a particular
physician. When maximizing her utility subject to the production and demand functions, the physi-
cian sets the optimal quantity of services to provide, as well as the optimal number of hours of work
and visit duration.
For the purpose of our study, we do not need to de￿ne a more formal theoretical model. Our
representation of the physician￿ s behaviour is fully static. Within this framework, the physician￿ s
1In France visit duration does not a⁄ect the level of payment for a visit, although a longer duration is likely to
contribute to better care quality. Hence, in our production function the Gp￿ s output is closely related to the number of









































9earnings depend only on the quantity of services provided. This quantity is in￿ uenced, on the demand
side, by the number of physicians and visit duration and, on the supply side, by the physician￿ s
preferences regarding consumption and leisure. This representation is inspired by the model built by
Bolduc et al. (1996) to study doctors￿location choices. As in McGuire and Pauly (1991), we could add
a term describing demand inducement. It would positively in￿ uence the demand for care and have a
negative impact on the physician￿ s utility.
2.3 The number of practicing physicians
The supply of physicians is de￿ned by the number of students who successfully complete medical
studies in France. There is no regulation of the number of new practitioners through practice licences:
every trained student is allowed to set up anywhere in the country. European students trained abroad
are allowed to practice in France, provided they speak French and are not forbidden to practice in
their own countries. Actually, foreign GPs are rare: in 2006, they represent only 1,8% of all practising
GPs.2
Until 1988; the studies to become a GP lasted 7 years. Afterwards, medical studies were length-
ened to 8 years in 1988 and 9 years in 2001. An exam for all medical students (Les Øpreuves classantes
nationales- ECN) was introduced in 2004, to better channel medical students into the various special-
ties, general practice being one of them. This reform has substantially altered the process of choice for
general practice. A student with a high rank can now choose another specialty while, before the reform,
she had to plan in advance whether she wanted to become a GP or not. In addition, this reform led
many students to choose to repeat a year in order to reach a rank which would give them access to the
specialty of their choice. Together with the selection introduced earlier by the numerus clausus, which
obliged many students to repeat the ￿rst year, these individual strategies have lengthened medical
studies to 9 or 10 years.









































9Places in medical schools have been regulated since 1971 via the numerus clausus, which introduced
severe selection at the end of the ￿rst year. Depending on the year considered, only 10% to 20% of the
students are allowed to continue with their medical education after the ￿rst year. The goal of earnings￿
improvement was not made explicit in France. Current government reports claim that the aim of this
policy is to limit the number of physicians (SØnat, 2007) in order to help monitor the supply of health
care and contain health expenditure growth.
The numerus clausus de￿nes the annual number of students allowed to continue their medical
studies after the ￿rst year. It was initially set at about 8,500 places. After its introduction it remained
fairly constant for several years. At the end of the seventies, all the French physicians￿associations
had become aware that their earnings were threatened by an excessive number of physicians: they
put pressure on the government for a sizeable reduction in the numerus clausus (Deplaude, 2007).
Afterwards, the latter was continuously reduced during about two decades, until 1999. During the
nineties, it was set at a rather low level of 3,500 places.
This reform is similar to the action of the American Medical Association in the United States at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Following the Flexner Report in 1910, the number and capacity of
medical schools was decreased. According to McGuire (2000), the decrease in the physician: population
ratio that occurred between 1910 and 1965 contributed to elevate physicians￿economic position. Today,
American physicians have very high earnings relative to other professionals compared to their collegues
in other OECD countries (OECD, 2006).3
The potential in￿ uence of the numerus clausus is twofold: (i) it contributes to a decrease in the
number of new practioners, thus increasing potential demand for each physician; (ii) the selection
introduced by the numerus clausus sets up a tournament between ￿rst year students, which may lead
to an improvement in the average ability of physicians. This paper examines whether the decrease in
the number of new doctors caused by the numerus clausus contributed to an increase in physicians￿
3On average, their income is 4.2 higher than GDP per capita for GPs and 6.6 higher for specialists. US is at the ￿rst











































2.4 Recurrent problems in French ambulatory care regulation
In France, the regulation of ambulatory care is beset with recurrent problems which might eventually
create serious di¢ culties. For GPs, the physician:population ratio increased until 2000, and is now one
of the highest among OECD countries (in second place after Switzerland, HCAAM, 2007). The geo-
graphic distribution of doctors in very uneven, which induces inequalities in access to care. Moreover,
there is empirical evidence of supply-induced demand for French GPs (Delattre and Dormont, 2003).
This behaviour is more prevalent in locations where the level of the physician:population ratio is high
(more than 110 GPs per 100;000 inhabitants).
Finally, there seems to be a decline in the attractiveness of the self-employed GP profession. Indeed,
the 2004 reform in medical education (introduction of ECN) has revealed that many students prefer
not to specialize in general practice: 14% of the available GP positions were not chosen in 2006; in
2005, this proportion reached 40% (Billaut, 2006). Furthermore, fewer students are willing to become
self-employed; many choose to be salaried at the end of their studies (Bourgueil, 2007).
The issue of the attractiveness of the GP profession is beyond the scope of this article. However,
the shortage of candidates for GP positions is a symptom of problems attached to this profession. Our
study examines whether there are substantial generational di⁄erences in GPs￿earnings.
3 Basic features of the data
3.1 The sample
We have at our disposal a 10% random sample of self-employed GPs practicing in France between
1983 and 2004. It is drawn from an administrative ￿le collected by the public health insurance scheme









































9insurance is mandatory and universal in France, this sample is drawn from an exhaustive source of
information about self-employed physicians.4
The panel is unbalanced: each physician i is observed for a period Ti, which can begin after 1983
(for a physician who goes into practice after 1983) or end before 2004 (for a physician who retires
before 2004). For each physician i at year t, we have information about age, gender, year of PhD, year
of the beginning of practice, level and composition of activity (o¢ ce visits, home visits, surgery or
radiology), location (95 dØpartements in 22 rØgions), and practice earnings.
We decided to focus on sector 1 GPs. Sector 2 GPs represent a small proportion of total GPs:
13%.
We de￿ne each cohort by the ￿rst year in self-employed practice. Our complete dataset provides
information about GPs belonging to cohorts 1945 to 2003. This information has been used in the
descriptive analysis of the cohort pyramid in the next subsection. In the econometric analysis, however,
we selected GPs belonging to cohorts 1970 to 2001: Indeed, the number of GPs belonging to older
cohorts was too small to allow for relevant statistical inference5.
The ￿nal sample used for the econometric analysis consists of 6;016 GPs with a total of 81;691
individual-year observations from 1983 to 2004. We observe 32 cohorts and 95 to 290 physicians per
cohort. Experience ranges from 1 to 34 years (Table 1).
Basic features of the data are displayed in table 2. The proportion of female physicians increases
rapidly over the period, from 13% in 1983 to about 25% in 2004. The average experience level triples
between 1983 (5:8 years) and 2004 (17:6 years). This re￿ ects the ageing of the physician population,
due to the combined e⁄ects of the baby-boom and of the policies implemented from the mid 70s to
reduce the number of physicians.
Earnings are calculated on the basis of the total fees received by the GP during the year. By
4Self-employed physicians account for 84% of physicians engaged in ambulatory care, the others being salaried doctors
who work in schools or within ￿rms.
5In addition, these doctors are not representative, since their observability derives from the fact that they are not









































9matching our database with ￿scal records, we were able to compute earnings net of expenses (rent for
the o¢ ce, payments for the secretary, etc.) at the individual level for years 1993￿2004. In 2004, average
earnings net of expenses equal e 62;024. Earnings of French GPs appear to be rather moderate. Using
the OECD Health Database (2006) we ￿nd that earnings of American, Swiss, Canadian and British
self-employed GPs are, respectively, 91%, 29%, 26% and 12% higher than earnings of their French
counterparts (in US $ PPP).
Table 1 : Structure of the sample
Cohort (First year
in activity)
Sample size Number of
observed
physicians
Years observed Range of
experience (1)
1970 1,290 97 1983-2004 13-34











1984 4,095 255 1985-2004 1-20
1985 3,881 250 1986-2004 1-19











2000 509 138 2001-2004 1-4
2001 264 95 2002-2004 1-3
Total 81,691 6,016 1983-2004 1-34
Notes: (1) Experience is the number of years of practice= year of observation - ￿rst year of practice - duration









































9Table 2 : Basic features of the data
1983 1993 2004






















Number of observations 2,458 3,761 4,496
Notes: French GPs, sector 1, period 1983-2004, 81,691 observations, cohorts 1970-2001. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
3.2 The cohort pyramid
Figure 1 displays the "cohort pyramid" drawn from our dataset, each cohort being de￿ned by the
￿rst year in practice. This pyramid has a very chaotic shape, which results from the combined e⁄ects
of demographic changes and the numerus clausus.
To illustrate demographic changes, we have drawn the curve of the number of births 30 years earlier
(on average, GPs begin their practice at age 30). Some typical cohorts are labelled but all cohorts are
analysed in our study. Figure 1 shows a huge increase in the number of physicians for cohorts 1974
to 1978 : this is due to the baby-boom, given that the number of places in medical schools was not
regulated for these cohorts.
The numerus clausus introduced a discrepancy between changes in the number of new GPs and
general population growth, as shown on the right side of the ￿gure. We have displayed the value of the
numerus clausus 9 years before the beginning of the practice (this interval corresponds to the average
duration of medical studies). The pattern of the numerus clausus curve is noteworthy. It was fairly









































9policy was implemented only from 1979 on: its e⁄ects can be observed only beginning with the 1988
cohort.
The small number of physicians belonging to pre-1970 cohorts is due to retirements (left side of
￿gure 1).



















































































































Notes: A cohort is de￿ned by the ￿rst year of practice.
The number of births (continuous line) is given 30 years before the ￿rst year of practice.
The numerus clausus is the number of students allowed to go on with their studies after the ￿rst year. In the
￿gure is displayed the numerus clausus (dotted line) 9 years before the ￿rst year of practice
Figure 2 displays average GPs￿earnings (in 2004 Euros) by cohort in relation to experience. To









































9￿gure 1). In such a ￿gure, cohort, time and experience e⁄ects are intertwined. For instance, recent
cohorts are situated at a relatively high level because they bene￿ted from increases in reference fees
that occurred regularly over the period, while older cohorts were by de￿nition excluded from these
increases. Econometric estimation makes it possible to disentangle cohort, time and experience e⁄ects.
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94 Estimating the earnings function
4.1 Empirical speci￿cation
Consider yict the log of earnings (in 2004 euros) in year t of the physician i belonging to cohort c. Our
speci￿cation is the following:
yict = a + D0
ictb + Z
0
icd + ￿r + ￿e + ￿t + ￿c + "ict ;
with i = 1;:::N; c = 1::::C; t = 1::::T; e = 1::::E; r = 1;:::R:
(1)
Vector D0
ict comprises two indicators of medical density: the number of GPs and the number of
specialists per 100;000 inhabitants in the dØpartement where physician i works. GP density provides
a measure of competition intensity between physicians. Z
0
ic includes time-invariant variables such as
gender, the number of years between attaining a PhD and the ￿rst year of practice, the type of practice
(full-time or part-time), MEP physician6 or not, type of location (town, suburbs, urban sprawl or rural
area).
Experience is de￿ned as the number of years that have past since the ￿rst year of practice. The
in￿ uence of experience cannot re￿ ect returns on human capital since all GPs have the same education
level. The e⁄ect of experience on a doctor￿ s earnings results more from changes over time in the number
of patients than from an increase in productivity due to human capital accumulation. At the beginning
of her career, a physician has to attract a su¢ cient number of patients. The e⁄ect of experience can
re￿ ect this process of patient recruiting. After the beginning of the career, the total number of patients
may have a link with the physician￿ s earnings through two mechanisms: (i) it can act as a signal of
the doctor￿ s ability and thus stimulate demand; (ii) it can directly improve human capital: the larger
the number of patients, the more intense the daily training in medical practice. Moreover, the e⁄ect
6A MEP is a generalist who practices certain speci￿c activity: acupuncture, homeopathy, dietetic, etc. These kinds









































9of experience can re￿ ect changes over time in the physician￿ s preferences regarding consumption and
leisure. Indeed, self-employed professionals have more freedom than salaried workers in the allocation
of hours of work over their life spans.
Our data set allows us to use a more ￿ exible speci￿cation of the impact of experience than the
traditional polynomial function. We simply consider experience ￿xed e⁄ects ￿e , e = 1;:::;34: Similarly,
￿t , t = 1983;:::;2004 and ￿c , c = 1970;:::;2001 are time and cohort e⁄ects. As stated above, a cohort
is de￿ned by the ￿rst year of practice. We also specify regional ￿xed e⁄ects ￿r , where r refers to the
region of practice (there are several dØpartements within each region).
The extensive use of various ￿xed e⁄ects raises identi￿cation problems. Our speci￿cation is not iden-









￿t = 0 and
X
c
￿c = 0 (2)
X
c
c ￿ ￿c = 0 (3)
Constraints (2) come down to de￿ning a reference category for each e⁄ect. The reference category
is ˛le-de-France (Paris area) for the regional ￿xed e⁄ects ￿r: The reference category is 7 years for
experience and 1983 for time. For cohort e⁄ects, we imposed constraint (2) that e⁄ects ￿c sum to zero.
Constraint (3) deals with another source of colinearity: for each physician i, one has t = c + e: For
instance, in the year 1990, GPs of cohort 1970 have 20 years of experience.7 This colinearity problem
can be solved by the use of one additional linear constraint which can be speci￿ed in numerous ways
(Deaton, 1997). The empirical literature generally focuses on the choice between constraint (3) and
7 This is not true for all GPs of the sample, given that some of them experience a temporary break in their career. In
this case, we substracted the duration of the break to compute experience. Only 6% of the observations are concerned:












































t ￿ ￿t = 0 (4)
Constraint (3) imposes that there is no trend in cohort e⁄ects, whereas constraint (4) imposes that
there is no trend in time e⁄ects.
Estimates of time, cohort and experience e⁄ects di⁄er greatly depending on whether constraint
(3) or (4) is adopted.8 The history of the period 1983-2004 shows that (i) reference fees rose steadily
because of general agreements; (ii) the baby-boom and the numerus clausus induced large ￿ uctuations
in medical demography. These facts suggest that disallowing a trend in time e⁄ects would be overly
restrictive. They give support to the idea that there is no trend in cohort e⁄ects. We used alternative
strategies to eliminate the colinearity between time, cohort and experience. They validated the absence
of a trend in cohort e⁄ects (constraint (3)).9
4.2 Econometric issues
Since some GPs leave the sample for reasons other than retirement, our estimates may be a⁄ected
by a selection bias. An examination of our dataset reveals that some GPs leave the sample either
permanently (9% of observations) or for a transitory break (6% of observations). The reasons why
doctors leave the sample are only partially observed. Some of them move from sector 1 to sector 2,
where overbilling is allowed: it concerns 34% of permanent departures and 26% of transitory breaks.
Some move to another location (17% of transitory breaks). Other reasons for departures are not
observed. Physicians who leave the sample have lower earnings than the others, suggesting a possible
selection bias.
We cannot deal with this problem by using Heckman￿ s sample selection model. Because GPs who
8The experience pro￿le is strongly a⁄ected by the choice of constraint (3) or (4). Imposing (4) prevents any raise in
reference fees from being incorporated into the estimated time e⁄ects. The experience e⁄ects then capture part of the
time e⁄ects (Dormont and Samson, 2007).
9For example, we agregated cohorts into 5 groups and estimated ￿xed e⁄ects for groups of cohorts. Colinearity is
eliminated since t 6= (groups of c) + e. The pattern of the cohort e⁄ects estimated with constraint (3) is very similar to









































9leave the sample do so for several reasons, participation in the sample cannot be speci￿ed by a single
participation equation. Following Verbeek and Nijman (1992), we simply added ￿ve dummy variables
indicating if the GP has left the sample permanently or temporarily, to switch sectors, to change
locations or for another reason. This procedure does not provide a correction for attrition bias but
allows to check for its existence.
All dummies are negative and signi￿cant, revealing a selection bias. For example, we ￿nd that GPs
who experience a temporary break had lower earnings prior to the break (-12% if the break was due
to a sector change, -17% for a location change). However, this bias does not a⁄ect our main ￿ndings:
some coe¢ cients are slightly a⁄ected by the introduction of participation dummies,10 but this is not
the case for estimates of experience, time and cohort e⁄ects. This appears clearly in ￿gures 3, 4 and 5.
Our speci￿cation does not control for unobserved heterogeneity among physicians. Indeed, considering
an error-component model with a GP-speci￿c e⁄ect would prevent us from identifying the cohort e⁄ects
we are interested in. The model is estimated by ordinary least squares subject to constraints (2) and
(3). This comes down to assuming that variables such as the physician:population ratio or the type of
location (town, suburbs, urban sprawl, rural area) are exogenous. This is questionable: Bolduc et al.
(1996) have shown doctors￿location choices are in￿ uenced by expected earnings in each location.
We decided to perform a Hausman test to check for exogeneity of the GP:population ratio. In-
deed, each physician chose to set up practice in an area characterized by a given GP:population ratio.
Variables explaining demand for care services in each dØpartement are good candidates to serve as
instruments. Only two variables had a signi￿cant impact on the GP:population ratio: the proportion
of women in the population of the dØpartement and the logarithm of average household income in
the dØpartement.11 Using these two instruments, the Hausman test led to non rejection of the as-
10One change concerns the estimated coe¢ cient of the GP: population ratio, which is equal to -0.0025 for the speci￿-
cation without participation dummies versus -0.0026 with dummies. For the coe¢ cient of the gender dummy (female),
we obtain -0.343 without participation dummies versus -0.336 with dummies. These slight changes are the biggest we
observe.









































9sumption that the GP:population ratio is exogenous (p = 0:90): Moreover, a Sargan test validated
the instruments￿exogeneity (p = 0:22). Another exogeneity test can be performed by introducing a
slight change in the model speci￿cation. Since the specialist:population ratio is never signi￿cant, we
moved this variable from model (1) and added it to the instrument list. This enabled us to test for
the exogeneity of both GP density and the type of location (aggregated into three categories). The
Hausman￿ s test led to non rejection of the null hypothesis that these variables are exogenous (p = 0;26)
and the Sargan test validated the instrument exogeneity.12 Our ￿nding that GP density and location
type are exogenous is rather surprising. Actually, our tests are limited by the small number of available
instruments. Therefore, we were not able to carry out an exogeneity test for the regional dummies,
which are also related to location choice. These variables are among the explanatory variables of the
model used for the Hausman tests.
4.3 Results
We estimated three versions of model (1), one for each dependent variable: log of earnings, log of
physician￿ s activity or log of net earnings. Activity is de￿ned as the total number of encounters between
the physician and patients, where every encounter is counted as one (o¢ ce visit, home visit or small
procedure). For a given activity level, earnings level depend on the composition of activity and the
values of reference fees. In what follows, we discuss our results relative to the speci￿cation explaining
the log of earnings. When appropriate, we comment on results obtained on activity or net earnings.
The experience, time and cohort e⁄ects estimated on the speci￿cation explaining the log of earnings
are reported in ￿gures (3) to (5). The other estimated parameters are presented in table 3.
On average, female GPs earn 34% less than male GPs. Since reference fees are the same for all, this
gap is entirely due to di⁄erences in activity: in the speci￿cation explaining the log of activity, we ￿nd
that female GPs￿activity is 33% lower than males￿ . Why do female GPs have fewer encounters with
12The instruments are jointly signi￿cant in the three ￿rst-step regressions (p<0.0001 for each regression). Interestingly,
the specialist:population ratio has a positive in￿uence in the ￿rst-step regression explaining the GP:population ratio:









































9patients than males GPs? Is their patient number smaller? Is their average visit duration longer? Do
female doctors have a preference for leisure leading to a lower number of hours of work? Unfortunately,
our database does not provide any information on visit duration, hours of work or doctors￿household
compositions. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2007) addressed these questions using US data relative to young
physicians. They found about the same gender gap in earnings: 33% in 1990. Exploring possible
explanations, they show that di⁄erences in preferences and behaviour account for the entire di⁄erential:
the reference income of female doctors is 26% lower than the reference income of their male colleagues.
In addition, male physicians take action if their incomes falls short of their reference income: they
do not raise their hours of work, but they spend less time per patient and focus on more lucrative
procedures to compensate for an income shortfall.
The GP:population ratio provides a measure of competition intensity between physicians within
each dØpartement. For patients, the time cost of switching to another GP is smaller when there are
many doctors in the neighbourhood. For GPs, an increase in the number of colleagues practicing in the
area lowers the number of potential patients for each doctor. Our estimates reveal a sizeable impact of
competition between GPs: a rise in the level of the GP:population ratio, for example from 100 to 110
per 100;000 inhabitants, leads to a 2:5 percentage point drop in their earnings (table 3). Conversely,
GPs do not seem to compete with specialists: the specialists:population ratio is not signi￿cant.13
13This is why this variable was used as an instrument in the exogeneity test discussed above (performed on a version
of the model excluding the specialists:population ratio). Nevertheless, table 3 presents the estimates of model (1), which









































9Table 3 : Estimates of the earnings function
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Female (ref: male) -0.3429 (***)       0.0041
Mep specialization -0.0650 (***)       0.0069
Years between PhD and 1rst year of practice -0.0224 (***)       0.0007
Part-time independent practice (ref: full time) -0.0524 (***)       0.0045
Part-time Hospital Practice (ref: full time)    0.0019       0.0024
Suburbs (ref : city)  0.0903 (***)       0.0041
Urban sprawl (ref : city)  0.1121 (***)       0.0079
Rural area (ref : city)  0.1452 (***)       0.0044
GPs :population ratio -0.0025 (***)       0.0002
Specialists :population ratio -7.78*10-6       0.00009
Regional effects
(ref :Ile de France (Paris area))
Rhône-Alpes -0.1113 (***)       0.0077
Picardie    0.2091 (***)       0.0105
Auvergne -0.0050       0.0126
PACA (Côte d’ Azur) -0.0775 (***)       0.0106
Champagne-Ardenne    0.1459 (***)       0.0124
Midi-Pyrénées    0.0274 (***)       0.0107
Languedoc Roussillon    0.0131       0.0128
Basse Normandie    0.0673 (***)       0.0124
Poitou Charente    0.0607 (***)       0.0118
Centre    0.0464 (***)       0.0099
Limousin    0.0172       0.0149
Corse -0.2328 (***)       0.0243
Bourgogne    0.0466 (***)       0.0111
Bretagne -0.0394 (***)       0.0095
Aquitaine    0.0519 (***)      0.0103
Franche Comté -0.0335 (***)       0.0129
Haute Normandie    0.1655 (***)       0.0105
Pays de la Loire    0.0726 (***)       0.0092
Lorraine    0.0973 (***)       0.0097
Nord    0.2143 (***)       0.0093
Alsace    0.0091       0.0102
R²
   0.2755
Fisher    269.56
  (p <0.0001)
Sample Size    81,691
Notes: Dependent variable: logarithm of earnings.
Method: OLS under constraints (2) and (3).
The estimated experience, time and cohort e⁄ects are displayed on ￿gures (4) to (6)
*** Statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level; ** Statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level; * Statistically signi￿cant









































9The negative in￿ uence of GP density comes on top of regional e⁄ects. Given that our speci￿cation
includes regional ￿xed e⁄ects ￿r, the estimated elasticity of the GP:population ratio is actually a
within-region elasticity. Regional ￿xed e⁄ects capture the time-invariant impact on GPs￿earnings of
certain characteristics of regions: amenities, average GP:population ratio and determinants of demand
for care services. Our results show for example (table 3) that physicians in the PACA region (the
C￿te d￿ Azur in the south of France) earn on average 8% less than GPs in the Paris area (the reference
region). In constrast, physicians in the region Nord (North) earn 21% more than physicians in the
Paris region. On the demand side, these di⁄erences stem from the fact that more GPs share a given
number of potential patients in PACA, where medical density is very high, than in region Nord, where
it is relatively low. On the supply side, these earnings disparities re￿ ect di⁄erences in expected utility
attached to each region when GPs chose their location (Bolduc et al., 1996). In other words, some
GPs are willing to earn 8% less in the south, where they work less and enjoy the sun. In the north,
they need 20% extra earnings to compensate for more work and a bad climate.
We now come to our estimates of time, experience and cohort ￿xed e⁄ects.
Experience e⁄ects
As shown in ￿gure (3), earnings are a reversed u-shaped function of experience. The pattern of GPs￿
career pro￿les is di⁄erent from the increasing and concave function of experience usually observed for
salaried workers. Firstly, there is a huge increase at the beginning of the practice. Between the ￿rst and
the seventh year (the reference year), earnings growth is 37%: Secondly, no stabilisation is observed
after the beginning of the career, unlike salaried workers whose earnings remain fairly constant for
much of their careers: GPs reach their maximum earnings after 12 years and then their earnings
decrease rapidly. In comparison with the level of earnings reached after 7 years, the gap amounts to -









































9To interpret this result, it is important to keep in mind that GPs￿earnings are closely related
to their level of activity. The ￿rst stage of the GPs￿career is characterized by a process of patient
recruitment, which translates into the huge earnings increase observed in the ￿rst years of practice.
After reaching a peak with 12 years of experience, GPs￿activity and earnings drop continuously.
There are numerous debates among labour economists about the in￿ uence of age and experience on
individual productivity. Our results on self-employed doctors shed light on the behaviour of profession-
als whose work hours are mostly determined by individual preferences, contrary to salaried workers
who are less free to choose their number of work hours. Our results indicate that GPs take advantage
of the freedom o⁄ered by self-employment by reducing their level of activity early in their career. They
concentrate their activity in the ￿rst 12 years of practice.
Edward P. Lazear (1981) has theorized that ￿rm managers set up earnings pro￿les designed to provide
productivity incentives for salaried workers. Lazear and Moore (1984) argue that such incentives are
not necessary for self-employed workers. They predict a ￿ atter earnings-pro￿le for the self-employed
than for salaried workers and produce empirical evidence in support of this prediction. However,
their results derive from estimates performed on cross-sectional data, which do not enable them to
disentangle cohort and experience e⁄ects. Our ￿ndings on longitudinal data do not con￿rm Lazear and








































































without participation dummies with participation dummies
Notes: Experience e⁄ects obtained by the estimation of speci￿cation (1);
Reference category: 7 years
I: 95% con￿dence intervals are provided for some of the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects
Time e⁄ects
Our estimates show that there was large and constant growth in GPs￿real14 earnings between
1983 and 2004 (￿gure 4). For 2004, the estimated e⁄ect equals 0.408, which corresponds to an average
yearly growth rate of 1.6% on period 1983-2004 (1983 is the reference year). In comparison, average
real wages of salaried workers grew by 0.6% over the same period.
Figure 4 also displays time e⁄ects estimated on the model explaining GP￿ s activity, i:e: the annual
number of encounters between the physician and her patients. The gap between the two curves is
due (i) to rises in fees granted by health insurance administration after bargaining with physicians￿
associations; (ii) to changes in activity structure over the period. Actually, changes in activity structure










































9of their home visits in favour of o¢ ce visits. Therefore, all the positive gap observed between earnings
and activity ￿xed e⁄ects in ￿gure 4 is a lower bound of the e⁄ects of changes in reference fees. The
main increases were obtained in 1988, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2003: Adjusting the earnings growth for
the increase in activity over the period, we obtain a lower bound for the pure e⁄ect of increases in
reference fees on real earnings: over the period, we ￿nd a yearly growth rate equal to 0.99%.
























Notes: Time e⁄ects obtained by the estimation of speci￿cation (1);
Reference category: 1983
I: 95% con￿dence intervals are provided for some of the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects
Cohort e⁄ects
Estimated cohort e⁄ects are very large: the gap in earnings between cohorts reaches up to 25%
(￿gure (5)). The cohort e⁄ect is large for cohorts prior to 1978. It drops for cohorts of the eigthies









































9earnings. For example, GPs who began their practices in 1985 earn 19:6% less than cohort 1972.
Earnings improved for GPs who set up their practices from the mid-nineties on: ceteris paribus, the
cohort who began in 1999 earns 16:8% more than cohort 1985.15






























constraint on cohort - without participation dummies
constraint on cohort - with participation dummies
groups of cohorts
linear quadratic function of three demographic variables at the beginning of the practice
Notes : Cohorts e⁄ects obtained by the estimation of speci￿cation (1);
There is no reference category: ￿xed e⁄ects are interpreted as di⁄erences between pairs of cohorts.
I: 95% con￿dence intervals are provided for some of the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects
5 Interpreting inequalities between cohorts
5.1 The impact of medical demography at the beginning of practice
GPs belonging to the same cohort have some characteristics in common: they belong to the same
generation, with possible speci￿c preferences; they faced the same numerus clausus at the beginning
15The estimates of experience, time and cohort e⁄ects obtained on net earnings are very similar to the results presented









































9of their medical studies; they set up their practices the same year, within the same demographic
context.
In order to examine the link between cohort e⁄ects and medical demography, we removed the
cohort e⁄ects from speci￿cation (1) and replaced them by a linear-quadratic function of three variables
characterizing the demographic situation at the beginning of each GP￿ s career: value of the numerus
clausus 9 years before the ￿rst year in practice; physician:population ratio during the ￿rst year in
practice; change in the number of GPs during the ￿rst year in practice.
Estimating model (1) with the linear-quadratic function of these three variables instead of the
cohort e⁄ects leads to the curve displayed in ￿gure 5. Its pattern is very similar to estimated cohort
e⁄ects. We ￿nd a correlation coe¢ cient equal to 0.79: the demographic situation at the beginning of
the practice is strongly connected to cohort e⁄ects.
The variables used in this new estimation capture mainly the number of new practitioners at
the beginning of practice and the di⁄erence between new arrivals and retirements. Why is medical
demography at the beginning of practice so important? Competition intensity between physicians is
already taken into account in model (1) with the GP:population ratio. At the beginning of her career,
a GP can buy her practice from a colleague who is retiring. Otherwise, she must ￿nd new patients. If
many new practitioners try to set up at the same time in the same area, the start up of the careers will
be hampered by competition between beginners. Our results suggest that the ￿rst years of practice
are decisive for a GP. If she fails to attract enough patients at this ￿rst stage, she will su⁄er from
permanently lower earnings.
Another way in which the numerus clausus might in￿ uence GPs￿earnings is that it introduces a
selection which might induce an increase in the average ability of physicians. Unfortunately, we do not
have information about selection rates for cohorts prior to 1987. Therefore it is not possible for us to









































95.2 Interactions between cohort and experience
Can a ￿ atter experience pro￿le compensate for being in a disadvantaged cohort? Time, experience
and cohort e⁄ects are speci￿ed as additive in model (1). This comes down to assuming that the
experience e⁄ect is identical for all cohorts. We tested whether interaction terms between cohort and
experience e⁄ects were signi￿cant on some pairs of cohorts that share a common range of experience.
No signi￿cant di⁄erence appeared between experience pro￿les of cohorts 1972 and 1977, whose common
range of experience is 11-27 years. Conversely, di⁄erences between experience pro￿les were signi￿cant
for cohorts 1977 and 1985 (range of experience: 6-19 years) and for cohorts 1972 and 1985 (range of
experience: 11-19 years).
For these pairs of cohorts the interaction terms are positive, revealing that GPs belonging to cohorts
with the lowest earnings compensate for their disadvantage by a ￿ atter experience pro￿le: they reduce
their activity after the 12th year to a lesser extent than other cohorts. This can be interpreted as an
additional disadvantage: given the di¢ culties they experienced at the beginning of their careers, these
GPs cannot a⁄ord to slow their pace of work early in their careers.
When the interaction terms are signi￿cant, the estimated cohort e⁄ects are stronger. For example,
the gap in permanent earnings between cohorts 1977 and 1985 is ￿22%; instead of ￿11:8% when
estimated without interaction terms. In that case, speci￿cation (1) underestimates the cohort e⁄ects.
5.3 Earnings distributions by cohort: a stochastic dominance analysis
Can individual heterogeneity compensate for average di⁄erences between cohorts? So far, our approach
has focused on average di⁄erences in GPs￿permanent earnings. However, the unobserved heterogeneity
a⁄ecting GPs￿earnings is quite large: model (1) explains only 27.55% of earnings variability (R2).
Yet, it is possible that some doctors belonging to a poor cohort compensate for their disadvantage
through individual dynamism or hard work. These earnings determinants are components of unobserved









































9earnings into account. Unobserved heterogeneity is no longer considered to be a residual but included
in the analysis.
Stochastic dominance analysis can be used to order earnings distributions associated with di⁄erent co-
horts . Following the methodology set up by Davidson and Duclos (2000) and used by Lefranc, Pistolesi,
Trannoy (2004), we ran non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance between pairs of cohorts.16
First, we applied statistical dominance analysis to distributions of raw earnings. Focusing on a few
representative cohorts, we found that cohorts of the eighties and the early nineties were dominated at
the ￿rst-order by the cohorts of the seventies and by cohort 1999. However, a ranking performed on raw
earnings in not relevant, since it compares cohorts that are observed for di⁄erent levels of experience
and for di⁄erent periods. Given the magnitude of experience and time e⁄ects, it is more appropriate
to compare distributions of earnings that have been homogeneized relative to these factors. In what
follows, we combine the stochastic dominance analysis with microsimulations.
In our second step, we constructed an hypothetical earnings distribution for each cohort, corre-
sponding to the amount that physicians would have earned if they had the same characteristics, except
cohort and unobserved heterogeneity. The simulated earnings e yict of physician i, belonging to cohort
c in year t is de￿ned as follows:
e yict = Db b + Z b d + b ￿Paris + b ￿10 +b ￿1995 + b ￿c +b "ict (5)
where D stands for the average GPs:population and specialist:population ratios, Z corresponds to a
full-time self-employed male physician with no MEP specialization and a two-year period after his
studies before beginning his practice. All simulated earnings are supposed to be observed in 1995 for
physicians with 10 years of experience practicing in Paris area. b b, b d, b ￿Paris, b ￿10, b ￿1995 and b ￿c are the
16Consider F and G; the cumulative distribution functions of earnings of GPs belonging to cohorts C and C0: Consider
a given level of earnings x ￿ 0 . F(x) and G(x) give the proportion of physicians of cohorts C and C0 whose earnings are
equal or lower than x: Distribution F dominates G at the ￿rst-order if, 8 x, F(x) ￿ G(x): We denote (F SD1 G): This
criterion does not make it possible to order two distributions whose cumulative distribution functions intersect. In this









































9estimated coe¢ cients of model (1); b "ict are the estimated residuals.
The results are displayed in table 4. We focus on a few representative cohorts: 1972, 1977, 1985,
1993 and 1999. They can be ordered using the ￿rst-order dominance criterion. Earnings distribution
of cohort 1972 dominates all other cohorts, except 1999; whereas cohort 1985 is dominated by all
cohorts. Cohorts 1972 and 1999 are equal: with identical characteristics, younger cohorts have the
same distribution of earnings as the better-o⁄ older cohorts. This is in line with the improvement
observed in the cohorts e⁄ects concerning recent cohorts.
The results of the stochastic dominance analysis thus con￿rmed the ￿ndings of the econometric analysis.
Belonging to a "poor" cohort has a systematic e⁄ect: unobserved heterogeneity does not compensate
for average di⁄erences in earnings between cohorts.
Table 4 : Stochastic dominance tests for selected cohorts - simulated earnings
1972 1977 1985 1993 1999
1972 - f (SD1) f (SD1) f (SD1) =
1977 - - f (SD1) f (SD1) p (SD1)
1985 - - - p (SD1) p (SD1)
1993 - - - - p (SD1)
Notes : ￿ (SD1): the row dominates the column for ￿rst-order stochastic dominance
￿ (SD1): the column dominates the row for ￿rst-order stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal
The tests are performed with a 5% signi￿cance level. Statistic values and con￿dence intervals are not reported
on. They are available upon request.
6 Conclusion
In France, almost all general practitioners are self-employed and paid through a fee-for-service scheme.









































9Given this context, GPs￿earnings are closely related to the number of their encounters with patients,
and hence on the number of other practicing GPs. In this article,we have examined the relationship
between changes in medical demography and earnings inequality among doctors.
Using longitudinal data, we estimated earnings functions to identify experience, cohort and time
e⁄ects. The cohort is de￿ned by the ￿rst year in practice. We ￿nd sizeable cohort e⁄ects: ceteris
paribus, GPs who began to practice in 1985 earn 19:6% less than those who began to practice in 1972.
Earnings where higher for GPs who set up their practices from the mid-nineties on: cohort 1999 earns
16:8% more than cohort 1985. These e⁄ects come on top of experience e⁄ects, time e⁄ects, and the
impact of competition intensity at the local level: they can be interpreted as permanent di⁄erences in
earnings associated to the ￿rst year of practice. Moreover, stochastic dominance analysis shows that
belonging to a "poor" cohort has a systematic e⁄ect: unobserved heterogeneity does not compensate
for average di⁄erences in earnings between cohorts.
Cohort e⁄ects are strongly correlated with the number of new practitioners and the di⁄erence
between the number of new arrivals and the number of retirements at the beginning of practice. We
could not test for causal e⁄ects, but our results suggest that the ￿rst years of practice are decisive
for GPs. Baby-boom cohorts faced intense competition at the beginning of their practices and they
have the lowest earnings. Subsequent cohorts bene￿ted from the numerus clausus on medical students
and from early retirement incentives implemented between 1988 and 2003. Our results show that these
policies buoyed up permanent physicians￿earnings.
Why is medical demography so crucial at the beginning of careers? Our estimated experience e⁄ects
show that the ￿rst stage of a GP￿ s career is characterized by a phase of recruitment of patients. It is
possible that di¢ culties experienced at this stage have a lasting impact on the whole career. Indeed,
a small number of patients for a GP who is no longer a beginner can act as a signal that the physician
is not competent and thus discourage potential patients. Further investigations are needed to give









































9GPs￿career pro￿le are di⁄erent from the increasing and concave function of experience usually
observed for salaried workers. GPs￿activity and earnings drop continuously after reaching a peak at
12 years of experience. In contrast with salaried workers, self-employed professionals can freely choose
their work hours. Our results indicate that GPs take advantage of this freedom by reducing their level
of activity early in their careers. This can be seen as the result of a preference for leisure. It is also
possible that GPs overwork at the beginning of their careers in order to recruit a su¢ cient number of
patients, which is crucial for their success later on.
Finally, these results show that returns to medical education di⁄er throughout the cohorts, de-
pending on regulation of medical demography. The low earnings for GPs in cohorts 1980 to 1990 could
explain why medical students have recently been reluctant to choose general practice. Policy makers
generally consider GPs to be a homogenous group. However, di⁄erences in earnings between cohorts
help in understanding why GPs set up a speci￿c association in 1984. Composed mainly of GPs be-
longing to disadvantaged cohorts, this association has very di⁄erent positions from other physicians￿
associations, in particular it advocates payment systems other than fee-for-service.
Further investigations are needed for a better understanding of GPs￿careers. GPs￿often claim that
their incomes are insu¢ cient, given the length of their studies. In future work, we will compare GPs￿
earnings and career pro￿les with those of salaried workers with a comparable level of education.
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